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Procedural Protections During Medical Peer
Review: A Reinterpretation of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
Anthony W. Rodgers*
I. Introduction
A physician walks into your office seeking legal advice. She is
highly regarded in the medical community. She holds leadership
positions in several medical societies, teaches at a prominent medical
school, and until recently held privileges at multiple hospitals.1
She informs you that her privileges were recently revoked by the
peer review committee of one of the hospitals due to her unprofessional
conduct. Then she begins to list the reasons why her conduct was
considered unprofessional. She took a doughnut from the nurses' station.
One of the nurses did not like the way she dressed. She used "blue"
language, but this language was routine for the male physicians.
You start to consider what causes of action she may have. She may
have a claim for breach of employment contract. You think there might
be a discrimination action available. You tell her you will need to do
some research but that you feel confident that she has some legal
recourse. Soon after you begin researching, you find out that you could
not have been more wrong. This doctor probably has no chance of
recovering damages.
Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
(hereinafter HCQIA) to encourage good faith peer review by providing
immunity from damages to hospitals and physicians who participate in
the peer review process.' In order to qualify for immunity, the peer
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.A., Texas A&M University.
1. See generally Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 758 A.2d 1090 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2000). This hypothetical is based on the facts in Bender.
2. See generally Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11101-11152 (2000). This Comment only addresses the HCQIA. Most states also
have laws granting various immunities and privileges to health care entities engaged in
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review process must meet four procedural standards that provide some
protection for the physician under review.3 However, courts have
required very little from health care entities.4 The result is that hospitals
and peer review committees are virtually assured immunity from
damages,5 and the physician is left with no recourse.
6
This Comment will examine how courts have interpreted the
HCQIA and propose a reinterpretation that is more consistent with the
language and intent of the Act. The proposed reinterpretation would
provide physicians with more procedural fairness. Part II of this
Comment will provide the context of the issue by describing the peer
review process and the consequences of an adverse peer review. Part II
will also provide a summary of the HCQIA. Part III will then examine
judicial interpretations of the HCQIA and suggest alternative
interpretations that would better effectuate the goals and intent of the
Act.
II. Background
A. The Peer Review Process
Medical peer review is the primary process for evaluating patient
care and weeding out low-quality physicians.7 This process occurs in
hospitals, managed care organizations, medical societies, and other
8settings. Medical peer review committees analyze physicians' training,
qualifications and experience. 9 The committees are generally made up of
practicing physicians who have specialized knowledge necessary to
peer review. See generally JONATHAN P. TOMES, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND PEER
REVIEW 65-255 (1994) (cataloguing state laws regarding peer review immunities,
confidentiality of peer review information, and duties to report adverse decisions).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11112
(establishing four requirements to qualify for immunity).
4. See Meyer v. Sunrise Hosp., 22 P.3d 1142, 1153 (Nev. 2001) (Shearing, J.,
concurring) (stating that hospitals only need to state "some minimal basis related to
quality health care, whether legitimate or not," to be immune from damages).
5. See Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Serv., Inc., 25 P.3d 215, 222 (Nev. 2001)
("The presumption of immunity has been interpreted by the federal courts almost
exclusively in favor of finding immunity ... ").
6. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
7. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit- Is It
Time for a Change?, 25 Am. J.L. & MED. 7, 15 (1999). Other methods include medical
malpractice and state licensing boards. Id. at 14. Additionally, hospitals are required to
engage in peer review in order to participate in Medicare and Medicaid services. 42
C.F.R. § 482.22 (2005).
8. Kenneth R. Kohlberg, The Medical Peer Review Privilege: A Linchpin for
Patient Safety Measures, 86 MASS. L. REV. 157, 157 (2002).
9. Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and
Federal Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 543 (2003).
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make accurate medical judgments.1° Physicians are reviewed upon
initial employment, every two years thereafter, and anytime a health care
entity)' has reason to believe quality concerns exist.
12
After reviewing a physician, the medical peer review committee
recommends whether the physician will receive or retain medical staff
privileges.13 The committee also recommends whether any limitations
should be placed on a physician's privileges.14 Although the governing
body of the health care entity makes the ultimate decision as to what
action will be taken, the peer review committee's recommendations serve
as the basis for this decision.
15
B. Consequences of an Adverse Peer Review Action
The consequences to a physician of an adverse peer review action,
6
are severe.' 7 An adverse peer review action often results in complete
loss of medical staff privileges. 18  In order to maintain a practice, a
physician needs hospitals and the technology and support structures that
hospitals provide.' 9 Therefore, loss of privileges is essentially the same
10. Id.
11. National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and
Other Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2005) (defining a health care entity as
a hospital or "an entity that provides health care services, and engages in professional
review activity ... or a committee of that entity"). Although the health care entity is
usually a hospital, the definition is broad enough to cover many other entities. See, e.g.,
Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc. 308 F.3d 25, 44 (1st Cir. 2002) (granting immunity
to insurance provider); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6387 (stating that the bill would encourage hospitals, insurance
companies, and other health care entities to report adverse actions in exchange for
immunity).
12. See George E. Newton III, Commentary, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling
the Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723,
725 (2001).
13. See id.
14. See Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1117
(1988) (stating that peer review committees set the parameters of a physician's
privileges).
15. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 13.
16. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11151(1) (2000)
(defining an adverse peer review action as one that reduces, restricts, suspends, revokes
or fails to renew clinical privileges or membership in a health care entity).
17. See William J. Tabor, The Battle for Hospital Privileges, 249 JAMA 526, 526
(1983) (calling loss of privileges "an economic catastrophe"); Fred M. Zeder, Defending
Doctors in Disciplinary Proceedings, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Jan. 2004, at 22, 23 ("doctor loses a
livelihood"); see also Purgess v. Sharrock, No. 91 Civ. 0621(JSM), 1993 WL 426524, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 19, 1993) (finding that a physician's career is worth $4.6 million).
18. See TOMES, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that peer review committees recommend
whether privileges should be reduced or revoked).
19. See id. at 13 (noting that only hospitals can provide the technology and support
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as loss of employment.20
Moreover, due to national reporting requirements, 2' an adversely
reviewed physician will have a difficult time reestablishing a practice at
another hospital or clinic. 22  Any health care entity that the physician
applies to would be on notice of the physician's prior substandard
performance.23 By hiring an adversely reviewed physician, a health care
entity would expose itself to liability.24  Given that few, if any, health
care entities would be willing to assume this liability, an adversely
reviewed physician would likely be unable to find a new clinic or
hospital willing to grant privileges.
2 5
An adverse peer review action may result in curtailment of a
physician's privileges. 26  Physicians in this situation suffer
economically, 27 as they are prevented from performing, and receiving
compensation for, the curtailed procedures.2 8
structure that physicians need in order to practice); Lee S. Goldsmith & Mary Bertolet,
The Present Status of Physician Privileges, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121, 121 (1981)
(noting that a physician without privileges is certain to become a physician without
patients and that privileges in at least one hospital is necessary to survive professionally);
see also Tabor, supra note 17, at 526 (discussing the need for hospital privileges to gain
access to increasingly sophisticated tools); cf Dennis Cauchon & Julie Appleby, Hospital
Building Boom in 'Burbs: Facilities Stress High-tech Care, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2006, at
Al (noting that the hospital industry has spent more than $100 billion in the last five
years on new facilities and technology).
20. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 13.
21. See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the reporting requirements of the HCQIA).
22. See David W. Jorstad, Note, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review
Participants for Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 692, 693
(1978-79) (stating that suspension of privileges at one hospital makes "it difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain staff privileges at a new hospital"); see also JOINT COMMISSION ON
ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HoSPITALS/1986 102
(1986) [hereinafter JCAH] (stating that it is strongly recommended that hospitals require
an applicant to disclose previous loss of clinical privileges).
23. See The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11135(b)
(2000) (stating that a hospital is presumed to have knowledge of information reported to
the national database).
24. See Braden v. Saint Francis Hosp., 714 P.2d 505, 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that a hospital may be liable for a physician's negligence if the hospital knew or
should have known of the physician's propensity to commit negligent acts); see also,
McCall v. Henry Med. Ctr., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 739, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that a
hospital has a direct responsibility to its patients to ensure staff physician's are qualified);
Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 79 (N.D. 1991) (stating that
a hospital has a duty to provide the public with competent physicians).
25. See Jorstad, supra note 22, at 693 (stating that suspension of privileges at one
hospital makes "it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain staff privileges at a new
hospital"); see also JCAH, supra note 22, at 102 (stating that it is strongly recommended
that hospitals require an applicant to disclose previous loss of clinical privileges).
26. See TOMES, supra note 2, at 23.
27. See Zeder, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that revocation or restriction of privileges
affects a doctor's livelihood).
28. See Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 13 (granting physician privileges to attend
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Even if an adverse peer review action does not result in loss or
limitation of hospital privileges, the consequences are still severe.29
Physicians who are placed on probation or receive a letter of reprimand
may lose their malpractice insurance. 30  A physician must have
malpractice insurance to maintain hospital privileges. 31 Therefore, the
end result could be an actual loss of privileges and the consequences
associated with such a loss. 32 Finally, an adverse peer review action
damages a physician's reputation.33 This damage affects the physician's
income through loss of patients and loss of referrals.34
C. Summary of the HCQIA
Congress passed the HCQIA in response to the "increasing
occurrence of medical malpractice," and the need to prevent incompetent
physicians from moving between states without disclosure of their
incompetence.35 Congress believed that effective peer review could
improve the nationwide quality of health care.36 Furthermore, Congress
believed that physicians' participation as peer reviewers was
unreasonably discouraged by the threat of monetary liability.37
The HCQIA includes two main provisions.38 The first provision
vaginal birth but not Caesarean section births). For example, an obstetrician may lose
privileges to perform Caesarean sections. Many patients may prefer Caesarean births or
may require Caesarean births due to an emergency. This physician would have to hand
off these patients and the fees paid by these patients to another physician who had
cesarean privileges. Thus, the original obstetrician would lose income by not being able
to perform the procedure.
29. See Zeder, supra note 17, at 23 (stating that discipline that does not affect
privileges still has serious economic consequences).
30. Id.
31. JCAH, supra note 22, at 109; Zeder, supra note 17, at 24.
32. See Zeder, supra note 17, at 23-24.
33. See Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc. 758 A.2d 1090, 1100 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000) (noting that the reputation of Dr. Bender, who taught at George Washington
School of medicine and held privileges at multiple hospitals, suffered from her de-
credentialing at one hospital); see also Zeder, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that adversely
reviewed doctors lose the respect of their colleagues). Even a very short suspension can
negatively impact a physician's reputation. See Wayne v. Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d
1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 1998) (suing for defamation because hospital disclosed short
suspension).
34. See Boczar v. Manatee Hosp. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.10
(11 th Cir. 1993) (stating that a negative peer review action can ruin a doctor's reputation
and career and "a negative decision by one hospital could be tantamount to excluding a
doctor from the profession as a whole" (internal quotations omitted)).
35. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2000).
36. Id. § 11101.
37. Id.
38. Id. §§ 11111-37. The Act is officially divided into three parts. The third part is
composed of definitions. Id. §§ 11151-52.
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promotes professional peer review by granting immunity to medical peer
review committees. 39  The second provision of the HCQIA requires
medical peer review committees which take adverse action against a
physician's privileges to report that action to a national database.4 °
1. Immunity
The HCQIA grants immunity from monetary damages 41 under any
federal or state law.42 The immunity extends to the professional review
body, its members, and any person who contracts with, or participates
with, the body with respect to the professional review action.43
Immunity also extends to persons who provide information to the peer
review committee, unless such persons knowingly provide false
information. 4
To qualify for immunity, the peer review committee must comply
with four procedural standards.45  First, the committee must act with a
reasonable belief that the action will further the quality of health care.46
Second, the committee must engage in a reasonable effort to obtain the
39. Id. §§ 11111-15.
40. Id. §§ 11131-37; 45 C.F.R. § 60.9 (2005). This part of the HCQIA also requires
reporting of medical malpractice payments by insurers and sanctions taken by Boards of
Medical Examiners. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-32; 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.7-60.8 (2005).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a). The Act does not restrict a physician from seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 9 (1986) reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6391; see, e.g., Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905, 918
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding there is no immunity from suits seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(a)(1). This limitation on damages does not apply to damages
under any law relating to civil rights. This section also does not prevent the United States
or any state attorney general from bringing an antitrust action or any other action
otherwise authorized. Id. Although the HCQIA allows damages in civil rights suits, a
physician is often unable to recover under civil rights laws. See Alexander v. Rush N.
Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 488 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a physician who holds
staff privileges at a hospital is not considered an employee and does not have standing to
bring a Title VII action for unlawful discrimination); Bender v. Suburban Hosp., 998 F.
Supp. 631, 637 (D. Md. 1998) (holding that physicians are not employees of privilege-
granting hospitals); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful...
for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
43. 42U.S.C. § Illll(a)(1).
44. Id. § 111 ll(a)(2).
45. Id. §§ 11111-12.
46. Id. § 111 12(a)(1). The "reasonable belief' standard is an objective standard. See
infra text accompanying notes 72-76. The House Energy and Commerce Committee
considered a "good faith" standard; however, the Committee did not want courts to
require "only a test of the subjective state of mind" of the peer review body. H.R. REP.
No. 99-903, at 10. The Committee intended the test to be satisfied if the peer review
body, with the information available at the time of the action, believed that the action
would restrict incompetent physicians or protect patients. Id.
1052 [Vol. 111:4
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facts.47 Third, the committee must provide adequate notice and a hearing
or other procedures which are fair under the circumstances.4 8 The Act
sets out guidelines for notice and hearing procedures which are deemed
adequate, but failure to meet the guidelines is not automatically deemed
failure to provide adequate notice and hearing procedures. 49 The final
procedural requirement is that the peer review committee must act with a
reasonable belief that the facts known after a reasonable investigation
warrant the action taken.5°
The notice guidelines call for the peer review committee to provide
the accused physician with the following: notice that a peer review action
has been proposed; the reasons for the proposed action; and a summary
of the physician's rights, including the right to request a hearing and the
time limit within which the hearing must be requested.5' If the physician
requests a hearing, the peer review committee should provide notice of
the time, place, and date of the hearing and a list of witnesses expected to
testify.
52
The hearing guidelines specify the rights of the physician and the
composition of the hearing committee.53 The physician has the right to
representation, to have a record of the proceedings made, and to receive a
copy of the record.54 Additionally, the physician has the right to call,
examine, and cross-examine witnesses; to present relevant evidence; and
to submit a written closing statement.55 The hearing should be held
before a mutually acceptable arbitrator, or the health care entity should
appoint a hearing officer or panel.56 If the health care entity appoints an
officer or panel, neither the officer nor any individuals on the panel may
be in direct economic competition with the physician being reviewed.57
The HCQIA creates a rebuttable presumption that the four standards
are met.58 In order to overcome this presumption, the physician must
47. 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(2).
48. Id. § 111 12(a)(3).
49. Id. § 11112(b).
50. Id. § I 1112(a)(4). The legislative history does not provide any guidance on how
this standard is distinct from the first standard. See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-903.
Courts have routinely collapsed these two standards into one and hold that a reasonable
belief that the peer review action would further the quality of health care satisfies both
standards. See, e.g., Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 38 n.13 (1st Cir.
2002) (following the lead of other circuits by evaluating standards one and four together).
51. 42U.S.C.§ lll12(b)(l).
52. Id. § 11112(b)(2).
53. Id. § 111 12(b)(3).
54. Id. § I 1112(b)(3)(C).
55. Id. § 111 12(b)(3)(C).
56. Id. § 111 12(b)(3)(A).
57. Id. § I ll12(b)(3)(A).
58. Id. § 11112(a). The legislative history indicates that this presumption only
applies to the first s andard. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 10 (1986) reprinted in 1986
2007]
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more standards
were not met.59
2. Reporting Under the HCQIA
In order to qualify for immunity under the HCQIA, a health care
entity must comply with the Act's reporting requirements. 60 The health
care entity must report to the National Practitioner's Data Bank6 1 any
action that adversely affects a physician's clinical privileges for longer
than thirty days.62 Also, a health care entity must report a physician's




Although the HCQIA requires that medical peer review committees
meet procedural standards to qualify for immunity,64 courts grant
immunity in almost every case, regardless of the procedures followed by
the health care entity.65 This Part discusses common interpretations of
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6393. The statute, however, states that the presumption applies to all
of the "standards." 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a). The effect of this presumption is that the burden of proof
at summary judgment falls on the physician opposing the motion. Therefore, courts
ruling on a motion for summary judgment must determine whether the physician
provided enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the physician had overcome,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption that the health care entity met the
statutory standards. E.g., Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1334
(11 th Cir. 1994) (focusing on whether plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the procedures were not met).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(c). A health care entity is only disqualified from receiving
immunity by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Secretary must conduct
an investigation, provide the health care entity notice of noncompliance and opportunity
to comply, and provide an opportunity for a hearing. If after following these procedures,
the Secretary determines that the health care entity failed to report the required
information, the Secretary publishes the name of the health care entity in the Federal
Register and the health care entity is no longer entitled to immunity under the HCQIA.
Id. § 11111(b).
61. Id. § 11133; 45 C.F.R. § 60.5 (2005). The National Practitioner's Data Bank is
an information clearing house that contains reports of adverse peer review actions,
medical malpractice payments, disciplinary sanctions, and license suspensions and
revocations. The information is confidential, and generally, the information may only be
disclosed to professional review authorities. Julie Barker Pape, Note, Physician Data
Banks: The Public's Right to Know Versus the Physician's Right to Privacy, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 975, 977 (1997); see 45 C.F.R. § 60.11 (2005) (listing authorities
authorized to access information).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a).
63. Id.
64. See supra Part II.C.I.
65. See Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Serv., 25 P.3d 215, 222 (Nev. 2001) (stating
that only two federal courts have reversed an order of summary judgment granting
1054 [Vol. 111:4
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each of the four procedural standards and proposes an interpretation that
is more faithful to the legislative intent and language of the HCQIA. The
organization of this section mirrors the layout of the Act. First, this
section will address judicial interpretations of whether an action was
taken in the reasonable belief of furthering the quality of health care.66
Second, this section will discuss judicial interpretations of what is a
reasonable effort to obtain the facts.67 Third, this section will discuss
judicial interpretations of what is a fair hearing under the
circumstances. 68 Fourth, this section will address the reasonable belief
that the action was warranted by the known facts standard. Since the
fourth standard is routinely treated as the same as the first standard,69
there are few cases that analyze the fourth standard.70  However, this
section does contain a discussion of how the fourth standard should be
treated differently from the first. 7'
A. Reasonable Belief the Action Furthers Health Care Quality
When determining whether a peer review action was taken in the
reasonable belief that it would further the quality of health care, the
courts apply an objective test.72 This objective test originated in Austin
v. McNamara.73 The Austin court decided that the test must be objective
in order to comply with the legislative intent of resolving questions of
immunity through summary judgment.74 Under this objective test, courts
generally eliminate any consideration of the peer review committee's
75subjective intent. By eliminating subjective intent, courts allow peer
review actions taken in bad faith to stand.76
immunity because the physician demonstrated that the procedural requirements were not
met).
66. See infra Part III.A.
67. See infra Part III.B.
68. See infra Part III.C.
69. See supra note 50.
70. But see Brader v. Allegheney Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 843 (3d Cir. 1999)
(analyzing fourth requirement); Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp. 87 F.3d 624, 638 (3d
Cir. 1996) (analyzing fourth requirement).
71. See infra Part III.D.
72. See, e.g., Mathews, 87 F.3d at 635 (agreeing with sister circuits that the
reasonable belief test is objective).
73. See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting an
objective test so that immunity can be resolved as early in the litigation as possible).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Meyers v. Logan Mem'l Hosp., 82 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716 (W.D. Ky.
2000) (reasoning that "the test is an objective one, so bad faith is immaterial" (quoting
Austin, 979 F.2d at 734)).
76. See Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 758 A.2d 1090, 1100 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000) (stating that even sexual discrimination by a peer review committee "which would
be considered illegal in the context of employment [is] irrelevant when challenging a
2007] 1055
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Perhaps the most egregious example of a court disregarding the
subjective intent of a peer review committee occurred in Wieters v.
Roper Hospital, Inc.77 Dr. Wieters introduced into evidence a letter
written by the chairman of the peer review committee. The letter
complained about the process by which the inquiry into Dr. Wieters was
made and stated that the process was "the result of a vendetta against Dr.
Wieters. 79 The court held that despite the evidence of a vendetta, a
reasonable jury could not conclude that Dr. Wieters had overcome the
presumption that the peer review committee did not act in the furtherance
of quality health care.8°
The legislative history of the HCQIA does not support this
interpretation of the Act. Congress initially considered a good faith
test; 81 however, it was concerned that such a test would be
"misinterpreted by courts as requiring only a test of the subjective state
of mind" of the peer review committee members.82 Therefore, Congress
adopted the "more objective 'reasonable belief standard. 83
Furthermore, Congress still intended the HCQIA to "encourage good
faith professional review activities of health care entities. '84 Congress
titled the chapter containing the immunity provisions: "Encouraging
Good Faith Professional Review Activities. 85  Thus, Congress
contemplated that subjective intent would be relevant to the question of
whether the committee objectively acted in the reasonable furtherance of
quality health care.
86
Including an inquiry into the subjective intent of the peer review
committee members furthers the intent of the HCQIA. As discussed, the
legislative history of the Act supports a good faith requirement.
87
Additionally, the main focus of the Act is to improve the quality of
medical peer review process").
77. See Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 F.App'x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a reasonable jury could not conclude that the evidence of a vendetta would overcome the
presumption that the action was taken to improve health care).
78. Wieters, 58 F.App'x at 45. The court noted that it was not clear whether this
letter was in the record when summary judgment was granted. However, the circuit court
considered the letter in determining whether the peer review action was taken to further
the quality of health care. Id. at 46.
79. Id. at 45-46.
80. Id. at 46.
81. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6392.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1.
85. See generally Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-52.
86. See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 741 (9th Cir. 1992) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Congress's intent was to encourage good faith peer review).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
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MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND THE HCQIA
medical care and restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to relocate
without disclosure of their prior incompetent performance.88 A peer
review action taken in bad faith does not further this goal and should not
be afforded immunity.
Even with an inquiry into the committee's subjective intent,
litigation could still be decided at the summary judgment stage. Since
the HCQIA creates a presumption that the peer review action was taken
in reasonable furtherance of quality health care, the burden is on the
plaintiff-physician to prove otherwise. 90 At the summary judgment
stage, plaintiffs will have had time for discovery and a chance to seek out
facts that would support allegations of bad faith. 9' Therefore, to
overcome the presumption, plaintiffs should be required to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that there are facts that support their
allegations of bad faith.92 Absent a showing of these facts, courts could
still grant the health care entity immunity and end the litigation at
summary judgment.93 Thus, courts could enforce the Act as Congress
intended,94 and health care entities would still retain the efficiency
benefits of deciding immunity early in the litigation.95
B. Reasonable Effort to Obtain the Facts
A physician who shows flaws in the fact finding process does not
rebut the presumption that there was a reasonable effort to obtain the
facts.96 In Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the peer review committee
sent a non-random sample of files to an independent reviewer. 97 The
88. 42U.S.C.§ 11101.
89. But see Austin, 979 F.2d at 734 n.5 (stating that a subjective test would frustrate
Congress's intent to decide immunity as early in the litigation as possible).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 11 12(a).
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (stating that answers to interrogatories, depositions, and
affidavits should be considered when rendering summary judgment); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that adequate time for discovery is
precondition of granting summary judgment).
92. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ("[A] party
opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but ... set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial." (internal quotations and citations omitted) (second alteration in
original)).
93. See id.
94. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
95. See lannelli v. Burger King Corp., 761 A.2d 417, 419 (N.H. 2000) ("Summary
judgment affords savings in time, effort and expense").
96. E.g., Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2002)
(holding that no reasonable jury could find that the audit flaws could overcome the
presumption that the investigation was reasonable).
97. Id. at 30. This review was the second audit conducted in this case. The first
audit resulted in a separate peer review action against Dr. Singh and was the impetus for
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sample contained all of the files in which Dr. Singh prescribed narcotics
and also erroneously contained the files of four patients who were not
patients of Dr. Singh.98 The reviewer was not told that the sample was
weighted toward narcotics files, and he incorrectly assumed that the
sample was randomly selected.99 The court noted that Blue Cross should
have told the reviewer that the sample was weighted, but the court found
that the weighted sample did not affect the reviewer's findings because
the reviewer engaged in a case-by-case analysis.'
00
This reasoning, however, fails to recognize that during his case-by-
case review, the reviewer could have been influenced by the large
percentage of narcotics prescriptions he saw in the files. Additionally,
the reviewer's comments on the narcotics cases were, at worst, mildly
negative.' The court held that a plaintiff is entitled only to a reasonable
investigation, and the flaws in the audit process did not rebut the
presumption that the peer review committee engaged in a reasonable
effort to obtain the facts. 
02
Courts should be more willing to scrutinize a peer review
committee's effort to obtain the facts. Courts are fact-finders. 03 This
practical experience means courts are uniquely suited to review fact
finding processes. 0 4 Additionally, this issue does not require medical
expertise, so there is no reason for courts to adopt a deferential approach
the second audit. Id. Although the court upheld immunity for the first peer review action
and considered the first audit relevant to the effort to obtain the facts during the second
peer review action, the results of the first audit were mixed. The first auditor praised Dr.
Singh for his holistic approach to diagnosis and careful treatment of low-income patients.
The first auditor did note over-utilization issues and commented that the standard of care
was somewhat below the recognized standard. Id. at 29.
98. Id. at 30.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 43. The court also noted that the reviewer's report contained criticisms
that did not focus on the Dr. Singh's overuse of narcotics. Id.
101. See id. (quoting the audit as saying "[m]ost internists" would have tried to avoid
or limit narcotics prescriptions). The auditor's comments regarding some other
treatments were substantially more critical. See id. (stating that Dr. Singh "failed to meet
minimal standards" in his treatment of patients with emotional disorders, and he "failed
to deliver quality care" to asthma patients).
102. Id. Dr. Singh also asserted that the audit was not reasonable because it was
overly narrow. The audit focused only on one type of case. The court found no merit in
this argument and stated that an audit is unreasonably narrow only if it fails to cover a
sufficient sample size. Id. at 42. Compare Brown v. Presbyterian Health. Serv., 101 F.3d
1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that a review of only two files was not a reasonable
effort to obtain the facts), with Egan v. Athol Mem. Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Mass.
1997) (finding a review of six files was a reasonable effort to obtain the facts).
103. See People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo. 2002) (stating that "fact
identification is clearly the prerogative of trial courts or juries").
104. See People v. Robarge, 262 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1953) (stating that injury trials, the
court's duty is to see that the fact finding function of the jury is intelligently and justly
performed).
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to their review of the investigation. 10 5  Instead this issue requires
procedural expertise, which courts possess. 10 6 Therefore, while keeping
in mind that the plaintiff has the burden of proof,10 7 courts should
scrutinize defects in the fact finding process more closely at the summary
judgment stage and allow disputed questions of reasonableness to go to
the jury. 1
08
C. Fair Hearing Procedures Under the Circumstances
The third procedural requirement is that the health care entity must
provide the physician with adequate notice and hearing procedures that
are fair under the circumstances.' 09 First, this Section will address
courts' condoning the participation of economic competitors in the peer
review process. Then, this Section will address courts' failure to
consider hospital bylaws as part of the circumstances surrounding the
hearing.
1. Participation by Economic Competitors
The HCQIA guidelines for what constitutes an adequate hearing
state that a hearing officer or panel member should not be in economic
competition with the physician who is under review. 10 Despite the
statute, courts routinely allow economic competitors of a physician to be
included on the physician's peer review committee.' In Wayne v.
105. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (deferring to agency when issue depends on "more than ordinary knowledge");
Patricia Mitchell, Jurisdictional Conflict and Judicial Restraint, MD. BAR J., Jan.-Feb.
2006, at 54, 57 (stating that agency expertise is the source of judicial deference to agency
decisions).
106. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency
Decisions, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 542 (stating that judges are experts in procedures).
107. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2000)
(assigning the plaintiff the burden of disproving the presence of the four procedural
standards); Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir.
1994) (stating that the "presumption language in the HCQIA means that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the peer review process was not reasonable" (emphasis in
original)); see also Gabaldoni v. Wash. County Hosp. Assoc., 250 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir.
2001) (adopting summary judgment standard that asks "whether a reasonable jury,
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff], could conclude" that a
preponderance of the evidence shows that the peer review committee did not make a
reasonable effort to obtain the facts).
108. See Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2002)
(stating that the "statutory scheme contemplates a role for the jury, in an appropriate case,
in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to HCQIA immunity[,]" and "a jury could be
asked to decide the ultimate issue of reasonableness").
109. 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(3).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3)(A).
111. See Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 F.App'x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding it
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Genesis Medical Center, Dr. Wayne's privileges were suspended
because she removed pages from her own medical chart." 2  The
committee that suspended Dr. Wayne contained two physicians in direct
competition with Dr. Wayne." 13 The court held that the participation by
direct economic competitors did not rebut the presumption that the
procedure was fair under the circumstances.'" 4 The court noted that since
the suspending committee was not acting as a hearing panel, the presence
of economic competitors was irrelevant as the HCQIA only addresses
economic competitors in the context of hearing officers or membership
on hearing panels."15
The Wayne court was correct in stating that the HCQIA only
specifically addresses economic competitors' participation on hearing
panels," 6 but the court did not recognize that the HCQIA specifically
calls for fair procedures under the circumstances17 Given that the
committee that suspended Dr. Wayne had members who were her
economic competitors," 8 the procedure was not "fair to the physician
under the circumstances." '"19
Although the HCQIA does not strictly prohibit participation by
economic competitors, its safe harbor provision for adequate hearing
procedures requires that a hearing panel not contain economic
competitors of the physician being reviewed.120 Additionally, Congress
anticipated that "the hearing panel or officer be impartial and fair" and
that the health care entity "will make every reasonable effort to find
appropriate.., members of the panel, even if this requires bringing in
reviewers from out of town or using physicians of a different
fair for the suspending committee to include economic competitors of Dr. Wieters);
Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
economic competitors did not disqualify the peer review panel from immunity because
the physician did not object to their inclusion at the time of the peer review hearing);
Wayne v. Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1145, 1149 (8th Cir. 1998) (allowing economic
competitors on the peer review committee because the members were not acting as
hearing officers); Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 637 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that the HCQIA does not prevent participation by economic competitors).
112. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1147. Her privileges were reinstated after she returned the
pages. Id.
113. Id. at 1149.
114. Id.
115. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1111 2(b)(3).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(b)(3)(A) (describing the hearing and notice standards).
117. Id. § I1112(a)(3).
118. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1147. Dr. Wayne was not without fault. She was notified of
the committee meeting in which her issue was to be reviewed. She was invited to
participate, but she declined to attend. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 11 112(a)(3).
120. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(ii)-(iii).
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specialty. 1 2 1
Courts should not allow economic competitors to participate in
medical peer review. This solution is consistent with the language of the
statute and the legislative intent. 122  Additionally, it is a fundamental
principle of due process that a decision-maker cannot have a financial
interest in a case. 123 Not allowing economic competitors to participate in
the peer review process would increase the appearance of fairness and
the overall legitimacy of the peer review process. 1
24
2. Failure to Follow Hospital Bylaws
When considering whether a peer review committee's procedures
were fair under the circumstances, courts often ignore hospital bylaws.1
25
Hospital bylaws govern the relationship between medical practitioners
and the hospital. 126 These bylaws also frequently set out the procedure
for the peer review process and the appeal process when physicians are
denied privileges. 127  Additionally, a hospital's bylaws are a contract
121. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 11 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6393.
The legislative history is replete with examples of concern that the Act would be a shield
for anti-competitive economic actions. Id.; see also Statement on Signing the State
Comprehensive Mental Health Plan Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1553, 1554 (Nov. 14, 1986)
(noting President Reagan's concerns that the immunity provisions may increase
anticompetitive behavior).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(3) (stating that economic competitors should not be on
hearing panel); H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 11 (stating that Congress's intent is that
"physicians receive fair and unbiased review to protect their reputations and medical
practices").
123. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551 (1965) (stating that "a fair trial in a fair
tribunal" is a fundamental principle of due process and American law has always sought
to avoid even the probability of unfairness); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)
(stating that due process requires that a judge not have a direct pecuniary interest in the
case); Dr. Bonham's Case, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (K.B.) (striking down a law that
granted the Royal College of Physicians the right to collect fines from the cases it
adjudicated); see also MAGNA CARTA at 40, repriqted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA
CARTA: TEXT & COMMENTARY 45 (rev. ed. 1998) ("To no one will We sell, to none will
We deny or delay, right or justice.").
124. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 551 ("justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice").
125. See Wieters v. Roper, 58 F.App'x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that nothing in
the HCQIA makes immunity dependent on a hospital following its bylaws); Meyers v.
Logan Mem'l Hosp., 82 F. Supp. 2d 707, 715 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (stating that the HCQIA
does not require a hospital to follow its bylaws). But see Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr.,
822 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (finding that if hospital had followed bylaws,
it would have provided fair notice and hearing).
126. John Hulston, Don Jones & Tim Gammon, Do Hospital Medical Staff Bylaws
Create a Contract?, 51 J. Mo. BAR 352, 352 (1995).
127. Id.; see also JCAH supra note 22, at 104 (stating that hospital bylaws must have
"[flair-hearing and appellate review mechanisms ... for individuals holding clinical
privileges and for applicants for such membership or privileges.").
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between the hospital and the physician.'
28
Consideration of hospital bylaws would further the intent of the
HCQIA. One way this interpretation is consistent with the statute is that
it encourages good faith peer review by requiring health care entities to
provide the hearing procedures that they contractually agreed to
provide.1 29 Secondly, requiring health care entities to follow their bylaws
is what is fair under the circumstances.130 Although the HCQIA does not
require any specific procedures, 13 and it allows health care entities to
tailor procedures to the specific circumstances, the procedures must still
be fair under the circumstances. 132 Given that bylaws create a
contractual relationship, it is only fair to require the health care entity to
follow the procedures agreed to in the bylaws.133 Furthermore, when
courts allow health care entities to breach their bylaws and still get
immunity, the physician is left without recourse for the breach of
contract because the health care entity is immune from damages.
1 34
D. Action was Warranted Based on the Known Facts
The fourth procedural requirement for immunity to attach is that the
action was taken in the reasonable belief that it was warranted based on
the known facts.1 35 Courts generally treat this test as mirroring the test
128. Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys. Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1987);
Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1986). But see Munoz v.
Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding that hospital staff
bylaws create a contract only when the bylaws express an intent that both parties be
bound); ef Hulston et al., supra note 126, at 352 (1995) (discussing open question of
whether medical staff bylaws constitute a contract in Missouri). See generally JCAH
supra note 22, at 103 (stating that the bylaws are "adopted by the medical staff and
approved by the governing body prior to becoming effective[,]" and the bylaws create a
"framework within which medical staff members can act with a reasonable degree of
freedom and confidence.").
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) ("Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party[.]"); see also
Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2 v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Unless pacts are enforced according to their terms, the institution of contract,
with all the advantages private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized.").
130. See Islami, 822 F. Supp. at 1377 (discussing the hospital's bylaws and fair
procedures under the circumstances).
131. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3)
(2000) (stating that failure to meet the safe harbor hearing procedures in the HCQIA does
not constitute failure to provide adequate hearing procedures).
132. See id. § 11112(a)(3) (requiring hearing procedures to be fair under the
circumstances).
133. See U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (2005) (defining contract as "total legal obligation" that
results from the agreement).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111 (creating immunity from damages under any law).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(4).
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for the first standard.1 36 However, since Congress wrote the first and
fourth standards as separate and distinct standards, it must have intended
that inquiries under each standard were separate and distinct. 137  This
section contains two suggestions for an appropriate and distinct test
under the fourth standard.
1. Action Tailored to the Known Facts
The fourth procedural requirement's language, "warranted by the
facts known," requires that a peer review action be tailored to solve the
specific issue identified by the peer review committee. 138  This
interpretation would create a distinct inquiry from the first procedural
requirement which focuses on furthering the quality of health care. 39 In
practice, the first and fourth requirements would end up working in
concert, but they would still be distinct inquiries. First, a court would
analyze whether an action could reasonably be believed to further the
quality of health care. 40 If an action passed this test, then the court could
inquire, under the fourth requirement, whether the action was too
expansive. 141
Consider the following hypothetical. A surgeon performs all
surgeries at an acceptable level of competence, except for one
procedure. 142  Because of the surgeon's mistakes in performing this
procedure, multiple patients have died in the operating room. 43 Now
assume that the hospital takes one of the following actions. The hospital
136. See supra note 50.
137. See U.S. v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (stating that a court's duty is
to give effect to every clause in a statute rather than to "emasculate an entire section");
FRANK E. HORACK, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION BY J.G. SUTHERLAND
§ 4705 (Callaghan & Co. 1943) (stating that a statute must be interpreted "so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.., and so
that one section will not destroy another"); see also Reiter v. Sonotone, Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 339 (1979) (construing a statute to give effect to every word used).
138. See Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 843 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that suspending a doctor's privileges to perform a certain procedure was narrowly
tailored and reasonable; thus, the action was warranted by the known facts).
139. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 11 112(a)(1) (requiring a reasonable belief that the action
would further the quality of health care), with § 1111 2(a)(4) (requiring the action to be
taken in the reasonable belief that it was warranted by the known facts).
140. See Brader, 167 F.3d at 840; Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624,
634-35 (3d Cir. 1996).
141. See Brader, 167 F.3d at 843 (finding action was narrowly tailored); Mathews, 87
F.3d at 638 (finding action tailored to the health concern).
142. See Brader, 167 F.3d at 836 (finding deficiencies in Dr. Brader's standard of
care through an internal review of one type of procedure). Dr. Brader was subsequently
suspended from all privileges due to unprofessional conduct. Id. at 837.
143. See id. at 836 (noting that fifty percent of the hospital's mortalities in abdominal
aortic aneurysm surgeries were Dr. Brader's patients).
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could suspend the surgeon's privileges completely, 144 or the hospital
could permit the surgeon to retain general privileges, but suspend the
surgeon's privilege to perform the procedure in question. 1
45
Now consider a court's review of the actions. Both actions would
be considered to reasonably further the quality of health care as each
would prevent future operating-room fatalities. Since the existing
interpretation of the fourth standard mirrors the first standard, both
actions would also be presumed to be warranted by the known facts.
However, using the interpretation proposed by this Comment, only the
second action would be warranted based on the known facts.
146
Complete suspension of privileges would be too broad, as there is only
concern with one procedure. Thus, the blanket suspension would not be
warranted by the facts known. 147 Suspension of the privilege to perform
the specific procedure would be warranted by the facts known, because it
is sufficient to address the issue of concern.
148
The proposed interpretation of the fourth requirement would
provide substantial protection for physicians and further the goals of the
HCQIA. 149 This interpretation still allows peer review panels to further
the quality of health care by preventing a physician from performing
procedures that the physician is not competent to perform.1
50
Additionally, health care would be furthered by allowing physicians to
continue to treat patients and perform those procedures with which their
level of care is acceptable. 15  Finally, this interpretation would protect
physicians from overly zealous peer review committees since the
committees' actions would be required to be narrowly tailored to address
specific issues. 
52
144. See Meyer v. Sunrise Hosp., 22 P.3d 1142, 1146 (Nev. 2001) (suspending all
privileges due to treatment of one patient).
145. See Brader, 167 F.3d at 836 (suspending surgeon's privileges to perform one
type of surgery).
146. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. See Brader, 167 F.3d at 843 (finding that the suspension of Dr. Brader's
abdominal aortic aneurysm surgery privileges was warranted by the facts known because
it was narrowly tailored to address the health care concern).
149. See Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1379 (N.D. Iowa
1992) (recognizing the HCQIA's goals of encouraging peer review and protecting
physicians who are reviewed by peer review committees).
150. See Brader, 167 F.3d at 837 (suspending Dr. Brader's privileges to perform
abdominal aortic aneurysm procedures in order to prevent imminent harm to patients).
151. See Tabor, supra note 17, at 526 (noting that when a physician's privileges are
completely revoked, patients lose their "traditional right to a physician of choice").
152. See Wayne v. Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 1998)
(suspending all privileges because Dr. Wayne removed pages from her personal medical
file).
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2. Subjective Intent
The fourth standard of the immunity test should require courts to
consider the subjective intent of the peer review committee members.
Congress intended that health care entities should be given immunity
only for good faith peer review actions.1 3 Good faith requires an inquiry
into the subjective intent of the peer review committee's members.
154
Since courts have eliminated subjective intent inquiries under the first
standard, 155 courts should consider subjective intent under the fourth
standard. 156
Both the first and fourth standards require a "reasonable belief.'
157
Since courts have interpreted "reasonable belief' to be an objective test
under the first standard, 158 they must also interpret "reasonable belief' to
be an objective test under the fourth standard.159 However, this does not
mean that subjective intent is completely eliminated from the calculus. 1
60
The language "warranted by the facts known" requires courts to
determine whether a reasonable person, given the facts known at the time
of the peer review action, would have determined that the action was
warranted. 16 1 Often, there are facts known at the time of the peer review
action that indicate bad faith on the part of one or more of the committee
members. 162 Therefore, when a plaintiff introduces facts that show bad
153. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
154. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (8th ed. 2004) (defining good faith as a "state
of mind consisting in... honesty or belief in purpose").
155. See supra Part III.A.
156. See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 741 (9th Cir. 1992) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) ("Evidence of motive and intent is relevant to show whether the [peer review
committee] possessed a reasonable belief that the [action] was warranted by the facts
known.").
157. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)
(2000).
158. See supra Part III.A.1.
159. See Atl. Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)
(stating that there is "a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning ... [b]ut the presumption is not rigid
and readily yields" when the context indicates that the word was used "with a different
intent"); United States v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 235, 240 (1886) (stating that the
Court "cannot, consistently with the rules of construction, give a different meaning to
substantially the same words").
160. See Austin, 979 F.2d at 741 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (arguing that motive and
intent are relevant).
161. See, e.g., Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905, 917 (8th Cir. 1999)
(reasoning that the conclusions of expert witnesses were not relevant because they were
not known at the time of the peer review action).
162. See Wieters v. Roper Hosp. Inc. 58 F.App'x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003). In Wieters, a
doctor on the peer review panel wrote a letter at the time of the peer review activities
complaining about the process and stating that Dr. Wieters was a good physician. Id.
The same doctor also stated that the peer review action was the result of a vendetta
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faith on the part of the peer review committee, the proper inquiry by the
court should be: Were there facts known at the time of the peer review
action that show bad faith on the part of the peer review committee
members, such that an objectively reasonable person would not think the
action was warranted? 163 If the answer to this question is yes, courts
should not grant immunity to the health care entity.
IV. Conclusion
Peer review is an important tool in improving the quality of health
care. To encourage peer review and improve health care quality,
Congress passed the HCQIA and granted immunity to hospitals and
physicians who participate in the peer review process. Congress
intended that health care entities would only engage in good faith peer
review. Thus, Congress made immunity contingent on health care
entities' providing some procedural protections for physicians who are
under review.
Courts, however, have not interpreted the HCQIA in a manner that
facilitates both goals. Instead, courts have uniformly favored health care
entities and virtually always granted immunity. This liberal grant of
immunity allows health care entities to engage in bad faith peer review
and provide little procedural protection for physicians.
Unfortunately, adversely reviewed physicians are left without their
career and without a way to recover damages for their loss. To prevent
this injustice, courts should reinterpret the HCQIA in a manner
consistent with the language and legislative intent of the Act. A proper
reinterpretation would still allow health care entities broad immunity
from damages and encourage physicians to act as peer reviewers, but it
would also provide appropriate procedural protections for the physicians
under review.
against Dr. Wieters. Id. While it is not clear that the second statement was made at or
before the time the peer review action occurred, it is still evidence of what the doctor
believed at the time of the peer review action.
163. See Austin, 979 F.2d at 740 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("Any inquiry into the
reasonableness of the reviewers' beliefs should at least consider any evidence of bias or
ulterior motive even though an objective standard ultimately applies.").
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